Page 233 - 《水产学报》2025年第8期
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何妤如                                                                   水产学报, 2025, 49(8): 089319

              of  RFMO  measures  shall  respect  the  sovereign  water  fishing  States).  In  the  meantime,  coastal
              rights  of  coastal  States  over  their  EEZs.  Tensions  States also engage in forms of minilateralism, form-
              are generally  addressed  through  bilateral  or   multi-  ing  internal  alliances  or  exhibiting  divergent  inte-
              lateral  negotiations,  by  specifying  applicable  legal  rests. While coastal and distant-water fishing States
              regimes within  agreements,  or  through  the   estab-  are obligated to cooperate, they often favor conflict-
                                                        [23]
              lishment  of  dispute  settlement  mechanisms .  ing governance models. For instance, in the WCPFC,
              Coastal States may also choose to join RFMOs con-  coastal  States  tend  to  adopt  a  post-sovereign  per-
              ditionally,  reserving  special  clauses  to  safeguard  spective, emphasizing the protection of EEZ rights
              their  legal  autonomy.  In  contrast,  for  non-trans-  through subregional bodies such as the FFA. In con-
              boundary  stocks,  some  developed  States  with  trast, distant-water fishing States favor post-national
              extensive EEZs and robust fisheries management   governance, advocating  for  organizational   man-
              regimes  may  resist  the  inclusion  of  their  EEZs  dates  that  match  the  ecological  scale  of  marine
              within  regional  frameworks.  For  example,  the  environmental issues and support centralized man-
              Convention  Area  of  the  North  Pacific  Fisheries  agement  over  the  Convention  Area.  Non-govern-
              Commission (NPFC) excludes the EEZs of coun-     mental  organizations  (NGOs),  engaging  from  an
              tries such as the U.S., Canada, and Japan, due to  observational scale, highlight the shared responsib-
              their opposition to upscaling national jurisdiction  ility  for  stock  conservation.  Aligning  management
              to the  regional  level.  Similarly,  certain   develop-  perceptions  can  be  an  effective  way  to  promote
              ing  States  have  opted  to  maintain  the  existing  regional  cooperation.  Fisheries  governance  in  the
              scale  of  governance  for  strategic  reasons.  For  Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) exem-
              instance, South American States yielding substan-  plifies  this  multi-scalar  complexity,  combining
              tial squid catches within their EEZs—far exceed-  coastal  State-led  EEZ  management,  the  WCPFC
              ing  that  of  the  adjacent  high  seas —have  chosen  regional  coordinated  governance,  and  subregional
                                                                                                        [25]
              not  to  extend  exclusive  jurisdiction  over  squid  arrangements  like  the  Nauru  Agreement  (PNA) .
              resources to the South Pacific Regional Fisheries  These  multi-scalar mechanisms  collectively   influ-
              Management Organization (SPRFMO).                ence the effectiveness and direction of governance,

                   Relations between power and responsibility in  promoting the translation of subregional consensus
              management  hierarchy    Power  is  embedded     (e.g.,  PNA  Vessel  Day  Scheme)  into  the  WCPFC
                                                  [24]
              within  the  structures  of  social  systems ,  where  provisions.  A  similar  approach  is  adopted  by  the
              scale  functions  both  as  the  foundation  for  power  General  Fisheries  Commission  for  the  Mediterran-
              accumulation  and  a  critical  factor  influencing  its  ean (GFCM), which has established separate tech-
              evolving trajectory. Cross-scalar interactions reflect  nical  subunits  in  the  western,  central,  and  eastern
              ongoing  processes  of  negotiation  and  compromise  Mediterranean Sea, the Adriatic Sea and the Black
              within  power  relations,  ultimately  structuring  the  Sea.  Among  its  Fisheries  Restricted  Area  (FRAs),
              governance  networks  of  organizations.  Notably,  the Jabuka-Pomo-Pit RFA stands out as a model of
              States operate  polycentrically  across  scalar   dimen-  spatially tailored  regimes  that  reconcile   conserva-
              sions—national, subregional, regional, and interna-  tion with cooperative management.
              tional —and  may  maintain  multiple  overlapping    Within  the  vertical  hierarchy  of  international
              “boundaries” at each of these levels.            fisheries  governance,  FAO  occupies  the  highest
                   In  the  horizontal  management  hierarchy  of  scale  as  a  global  coordinating  body.  Its  affiliated
              transboundary fish stock allocation, States are broa-  RFMOs such  as  the  Indian  Ocean  Tuna   Commis-
              dly  categorized  into  two  camps:  resource  holders  sion  (IOTC)  and  GFCM  operate  with  varying
                                                                                  [26]
              (coastal  States)  and  financial  contributors  (distant-  degrees  of  autonomy .  While  receiving  FAO’s
              中国水产学会主办  sponsored by China Society of Fisheries                          https://www.china-fishery.cn
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