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何妤如 水产学报, 2025, 49(8): 089319
of RFMO measures shall respect the sovereign water fishing States). In the meantime, coastal
rights of coastal States over their EEZs. Tensions States also engage in forms of minilateralism, form-
are generally addressed through bilateral or multi- ing internal alliances or exhibiting divergent inte-
lateral negotiations, by specifying applicable legal rests. While coastal and distant-water fishing States
regimes within agreements, or through the estab- are obligated to cooperate, they often favor conflict-
[23]
lishment of dispute settlement mechanisms . ing governance models. For instance, in the WCPFC,
Coastal States may also choose to join RFMOs con- coastal States tend to adopt a post-sovereign per-
ditionally, reserving special clauses to safeguard spective, emphasizing the protection of EEZ rights
their legal autonomy. In contrast, for non-trans- through subregional bodies such as the FFA. In con-
boundary stocks, some developed States with trast, distant-water fishing States favor post-national
extensive EEZs and robust fisheries management governance, advocating for organizational man-
regimes may resist the inclusion of their EEZs dates that match the ecological scale of marine
within regional frameworks. For example, the environmental issues and support centralized man-
Convention Area of the North Pacific Fisheries agement over the Convention Area. Non-govern-
Commission (NPFC) excludes the EEZs of coun- mental organizations (NGOs), engaging from an
tries such as the U.S., Canada, and Japan, due to observational scale, highlight the shared responsib-
their opposition to upscaling national jurisdiction ility for stock conservation. Aligning management
to the regional level. Similarly, certain develop- perceptions can be an effective way to promote
ing States have opted to maintain the existing regional cooperation. Fisheries governance in the
scale of governance for strategic reasons. For Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) exem-
instance, South American States yielding substan- plifies this multi-scalar complexity, combining
tial squid catches within their EEZs—far exceed- coastal State-led EEZ management, the WCPFC
ing that of the adjacent high seas —have chosen regional coordinated governance, and subregional
[25]
not to extend exclusive jurisdiction over squid arrangements like the Nauru Agreement (PNA) .
resources to the South Pacific Regional Fisheries These multi-scalar mechanisms collectively influ-
Management Organization (SPRFMO). ence the effectiveness and direction of governance,
Relations between power and responsibility in promoting the translation of subregional consensus
management hierarchy Power is embedded (e.g., PNA Vessel Day Scheme) into the WCPFC
[24]
within the structures of social systems , where provisions. A similar approach is adopted by the
scale functions both as the foundation for power General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterran-
accumulation and a critical factor influencing its ean (GFCM), which has established separate tech-
evolving trajectory. Cross-scalar interactions reflect nical subunits in the western, central, and eastern
ongoing processes of negotiation and compromise Mediterranean Sea, the Adriatic Sea and the Black
within power relations, ultimately structuring the Sea. Among its Fisheries Restricted Area (FRAs),
governance networks of organizations. Notably, the Jabuka-Pomo-Pit RFA stands out as a model of
States operate polycentrically across scalar dimen- spatially tailored regimes that reconcile conserva-
sions—national, subregional, regional, and interna- tion with cooperative management.
tional —and may maintain multiple overlapping Within the vertical hierarchy of international
“boundaries” at each of these levels. fisheries governance, FAO occupies the highest
In the horizontal management hierarchy of scale as a global coordinating body. Its affiliated
transboundary fish stock allocation, States are broa- RFMOs such as the Indian Ocean Tuna Commis-
dly categorized into two camps: resource holders sion (IOTC) and GFCM operate with varying
[26]
(coastal States) and financial contributors (distant- degrees of autonomy . While receiving FAO’s
中国水产学会主办 sponsored by China Society of Fisheries https://www.china-fishery.cn
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