Page 235 - 《水产学报》2025年第8期

何妤如 水产学报, 2025, 49(8): 089319

able to legally sourced catch, forcing exporters to tion, where smaller groups of like-minded States
comply with their regulatory standards. Such engage in flexible, issue-specific collaboration out-
“private scale” enables market States to circumvent side of formal frameworks. Such efforts may take
RFMOs negotiation and directly shape global fish- the form of flexible informal dialogues and work-
eries governance norms and practices [30-31] . The 2009 ing groups to advance joint proposals on targeted
Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA) rebal- issues. For instance, Indian Ocean island States
ances power dynamics between flag States and port such as Maldives and Seychelles have submitted
States, by authorizing port States to inspect visiting joint proposals to the IOTC, while Ecuador, Peru,
vessels calling at their ports. For instance, Durban Panama, Chile, and other Pacific coastal States have
Port in South Africa conducts stringent inspections collaborated on proposals to the SPRFMO. Further-
on Indian Ocean fishing vessels and has intercepted more, third-party interventions (e.g., NGOs, or
illegal catches as part of its compliance efforts. other influential States) can partially recalibrate
While port State measures often operate in concert scalar configurations, as seen when environmental
with regional rules, selective enforcement practices, NGOs use pre-meeting statements, in-session inter-
such as Southeast Asian ports sheltering domestic ventions, and post-meeting reports to generate pub-
vessels, reveal a “sovereignty-first” scale. These lic opinion pressure to catalyze policy reforms from
practices illustrate how the uneven application of the outside scale.

regulatory authority can undermine collective
3 POWER DYNAMICS IN RFMOS
enforcement and perpetuate jurisdictional asymmet-
ries in global fisheries governance. Under the UNFSA, cooperation with RFMOs
Under the RFMOs’ scalar framework, the provides the “entry ticket” for States to be recog-
scalar supervision approaches of stronger and nized as having a “real interest” in relevant fisher-
weaker actors also diversify. Stronger actors often ies and to engage in fishing operations within
seek to consolidate their advantages by reinforcing RFMOs Convention Areas . Fishing activities by
[32]
existing boundaries and governance policies to non-member States may be identified as illegal,
restrict scale adjustments. For instance, founding unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.
members may raise membership threshold for the However, membership or cooperation does not
eligibility of late-joining States, while historical automatically entitle a State to quota allocations,
quota holders leverage quota reductions to margin- particularly in cases where fish stocks have already
alize newer fishing entrants. These powerful actors been fully allocated, where fishing effort is low, or
play a central role in shaping a “rules-based” inter- where no active fishery currently exists. Horizont-
national fisheries order that aligns with their ally, stakeholders engagement generally follows a
interests, often by promoting high-standard compli- three-tiered structure: Members, Cooperating Non-
ance measures, such as seabird bycatch mitigation, members, and Observers. Members hold full priv-
marine pollution prevention measures, guidelines ileges, enjoying the rights to vote, submit proposal
for the release of non-target catch, and the use of and allocate quota, while bearing obligations to ful-
biodegradable, non-entangling fish aggregating fill data provision, compliance with management
devices (FADs), which effectively raise the tech- measures and financial contributions. Cooperating
nical and regulatory threshold for participation. Non-Members are granted partial or extended rights
Conversely, weaker actors typically amplify their and responsibilities but lack voting power and eli-
political influence through strategies such as public gibility for leadership positions. Observers may
advocacy, coalition-building, and collective resist- attend selected meetings and, in some cases, are
ance. These strategies include minilateral coopera- required to pay a nominal fee, but they do not parti-

中国水产学会主办 sponsored by China Society of Fisheries https://www.china-fishery.cn
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