Page 201 - 卫星导航2021年第1-2合期

Wang et al. Satell Navig (2021) 2:4 Satellite Navigation
https://doi.org/10.1186/s43020-021-00037-z
https://satellite-navigation.springeropen.com/

ORIGINAL ARTICLE Open Access

Binary phase hopping based spreading code

authentication technique

*
Shenran Wang, Hao Liu, Zuping Tang and Bin Ye

Abstract
Civil receivers of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) are vulnerable to spoofng and jamming attacks due to
their signal structures. The Spreading Code Authentication (SCA) technique is one of the GNSS message encryption
identity authentication techniques. Its robustness and complexity are in between Navigation Message Authentication
(NMA) and Navigation Message Encryption (NME)/Spreading Code Encryption (SCE). A commonly used spreading
code authentication technique inserts unpredictable chips into the public spreading code. This method changes the
signal structure, degrades the correlation of the spreading code, and causes performance loss. This paper proposes
a binary phase hopping based spreading code authentication technique, which can achieve identity authentication
without changing the existing signal structure. Analysis shows that this method can reduce the performance loss of
the original signal and has good compatibility with the existing receiver architecture.
Keywords: Global navigation satellite system, Message encryption, Spreading code authentication, Binary phase
hopping

Introduction technologies. Te encryption-based technology includes
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is an impor- Navigation Message Authentication (NMA), Spread-
tant national infrastructure, which plays a key role in ing Code Authentication (SCA), Navigation Message
vehicle navigation, civil aviation, fnancial transactions Encryption (NME) and Spreading Code Encryption
and many others (Liang et al. 2013). GNSS civil receivers (SCE) (Dovis 2015; Shen and Guo 2018a). Anti-spoofng
are vulnerable to spoofng and jamming attacks because technology can greatly enhance the security of informa-
the format and modulation of GNSS civil signals are pub- tion (Wesson et al. 2012).
lic ("GPS Interface Control Documents IS-GPS-200G" Te SCA technique is considered to be one of the key
2012; Humphreys 2013), and there exist obvious secu- innovations for the next generation of GNSS civil signals
rity vulnerabilities (Guenther 2014). Deception jamming (Margaria et al. 2017). Its robustness and complexity are
is divided into repeater deception jamming and gener- in between NMA and NME/SCE. For the SCA technique
ated spoofng jamming (Hu et al. 2016). It is of great unpredictable chips are inserted into the unencrypted
signifcance to study the anti-deception technology and public spreading code and verifed in receivers to ensure
improve the robustness of receivers. GNSS anti-spoofng the credibility of pseudo range measurement (Shen and
technology is categorized into non-encryption-based Guo 2018a; b). At present, the main implementation
technology and encryption-based technology (Psiaki methods of the SCA technique include Spread Spec-
and Humphreys 2016). Te non-encryption-based tech- trum Security Code (SSSC) (Scott 2003), Hidden Marker
nology mainly includes signal quality monitoring, dop- (HM) (Kuhn 2005) and Signal Authentication Sequence
pler consistency monitoring and other anti-spoofng (SAS) (Pozzobon et al. 2011; Pozzobon 2011). Te ideas
adopted at the signal level are inserting unpredictable
authentication chips into the public spreading code.
*Correspondence: tang_zuping@hust.edu.cn Te advantage of the SCA technique is that the received
School of Electronic Information and Communications, Huazhong
University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China power is − 160 dB·W. Unless the encrypted information

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