Page 484 - 《软件学报》2026年第1期

张泽源 等: RPKI 测量研究综述 481

[17] Shi XG, Xiang Y, Wang ZL, Yin X, Wu JP. Detecting prefix hijackings in the Internet with argus. In: Proc. of the 2012 Internet
Measurement Conf. Boston: ACM, 2012. 15–28. [doi: 10.1145/2398776.2398779]
[18] Sermpezis P, Kotronis V, Gigis P, Dimitropoulos X, Cicalese D, King A, Dainotti A. ARTEMIS: Neutralizing BGP hijacking within a
minute. IEEE/ACM Trans. on Networking, 2018, 26(6): 2471–2486. [doi: 10.1109/TNET.2018.2869798]
[19] Schlamp J, Holz R, Jacquemart Q, Carle G, Biersack EW. HEAP: Reliable assessment of BGP hijacking attacks. IEEE Journal on
Selected Areas in Communications, 2016, 34(6): 1849–1861. [doi: 10.1109/JSAC.2016.2558978]
[20] Kent S, Lynn C, Seo K. Secure border gateway protocol (S-BGP). IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 2000, 18(4):
582–592. [doi: 10.1109/49.839934]
[21] White R. Securing BGP through secure origin BGP (soBGP). Business Communications Review, 2003, 33(5): 47–53.
[22] Lepinski M, Sriram K. RFC 8205: BGPsec protocol specification. 2017. https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc8205.txt.pdf [doi: 10.
17487/RFC8205]
[23] Li S, Zhuge JW, Li X. Study on BGP security. Ruan Jian Xue Bao/Journal of Software, 2013, 24(1): 121–138 (in Chinese with English
abstract). http://www.jos.org.cn/1000-9825/4346.htm [doi: 10.3724/SP.J.1001.2013.04346]
[24] Wang Q, Li FJ, Ni XL, Xia LL, Ma Z. Research on blockchain-based inter-domain routing security enhancement. Journal of Frontiers of
Computer Science and Technology, 2024, 18(12): 3144–3174 (in Chinese with English abstract). [doi: 10.3778/j.issn.1673-9418.2407065]
[25] Ma D. Scaling RPKI relying party system. ZTE Technology Journal, 2023, 29(1): 40–44 (in Chinese with English abstract). [doi: 10.
12142/ZTETJ.202301008]
[26] Huston G, Loomans R, Michaelson G. RFC 6481: A profile for resource certificate repository structure. 2012. https://www.rfc-editor.org/
rfc/pdfrfc/rfc6481.txt.pdf [doi: 10.17487/RFC6481]
[27] Kent S, Kong D, Seo K, Watro R. RFC 6484: Certificate policy (CP) for the resource public key infrastructure (RPKI). 2012. https://www.
rfc-editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc6484.txt.pdf [doi: 10.17487/RFC6484]
[28] Huston G. RFC 6485: The profile for algorithms and key sizes for use in the resource public key infrastructure (RPKI). 2012. https://www.
rfc-editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc6485.txt.pdf [doi: 10.17487/RFC6485]
[29] Austein R, Huston G, Kent S, Lepinski M. RFC 6486: Manifests for the resource public key infrastructure (RPKI). 2012. https://www.rfc-
editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc6486.txt.pdf [doi: 10.17487/RFC6486]
[30] Lepinski M, Chi A, Kent S. RFC 6488: Signed object template for the resource public key infrastructure (RPKI). 2012. https://www.rfc-
editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc6488.txt.pdf [doi: 10.17487/RFC6488]
[31] Huston G, Michaelson G, Kent S. RFC 6489: Certification authority (CA) key rollover in the resource public key infrastructure (RPKI).
2012. https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc6489.txt.pdf [doi: 10.17487/RFC6489]
[32] Huston G, Weiler S, Michaelson G, Kent S. RFC 6490: Resource public key infrastructure (RPKI) trust anchor locator. 2012. https://www.
rfc-editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc6490.txt.pdf [doi: 10.17487/RFC6490]
[33] Manderson T, Vegoda L, Kent S. RFC 6491: Resource public key infrastructure (RPKI) objects issued by IANA. 2012. https://www.rfc-
editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc6491.txt.pdf [doi: 10.17487/RFC6491]
[34] Huston G, Loomans R, Ellacott B, Austein R. RFC 6492: A protocol for provisioning resource certificates. 2012. https://www.rfc-editor.
org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc6492.txt.pdf [doi: 10.17487/RFC6492]
[35] Bush R. RFC 6493: The resource public key infrastructure (RPKI) ghostbusters record. 2012. https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/
rfc6493.txt.pdf [doi: 10.17487/RFC6493]
[36] Bruijnzeels T, Muravskiy O, Weber B, Austein R. RFC 8182: The RPKI repository delta protocol (RRDP). 2017. https://www.rfc-editor.
org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc8182.txt.pdf [doi: 10.17487/RFC8182]
[37] Bush R, Austein R. RFC 8210: The resource public key infrastructure (RPKI) to router protocol, Version 1. 2017. https://www.rfc-editor.
org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc8210.txt.pdf [doi: 10.17487/RFC8210]
[38] Ma D, Mandelberg D, Bruijnzeels T. RFC 8416: Simplified local Internet number resource management with the RPKI (SLURM). 2018.
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc8416.txt.pdf [doi: 10.17487/RFC8416]
[39] Wählisch M, Maennel O, Schmidt TC. Towards detecting BGP route hijacking using the RPKI. ACM SIGCOMM Computer
Communication Review, 2012, 42(4): 103–104. [doi: 10.1145/2377677.2377702]
[40] Iamartino D, Pelsser C, Bush R. Measuring BGP route origin registration and validation. In: Proc. of the 16th Int’l Conf. on Passive and
Active Measurement. New York: Springer, 2015. 28–40. [doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-15509-8_3]
[41] Wählisch M, Schmidt R, Schmidt TC, Maennel O, Uhlig S, Tyson G. RiPKI: The tragic story of RPKI deployment in the Web ecosystem.
In: Proc. of the 14th ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks. Philadelphia: ACM, 2015. 11. [doi: 10.1145/2834050.2834102]
[42] Chung T, Aben E, Bruijnzeels T, Chandrasekaran B, Choffnes D, Levin D, Maggs BM, Mislove A, van Rijswijk-Deij R, Rula J, Sullivan N.