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王源源 等: 本地差分隐私频率估计伪数据攻击及防御方法 2227
6 总 结
针对子集选择机制和环机制两种效用最优的 LDP 协议, 本文设计了攻击效用最大的伪数据攻击方案, 并通过
攻击方案展示了子集选择机制和环机制易于遭受伪数据攻击的负面影响. 攻击者可以向 LDP 机制中注入假用户,
向服务器发送伪造的数据, 达到显著提高目标项目频率估计值的目的. 本文通过理论分析和实验评估证实了所设
计攻击方案的有效性. 最后, 本文提出了针对伪数据攻击的防御方法. 未来的工作主要包括深入分析伪数据攻击对
其他各种 LDP 机制的影响, 以及设计安全高效的防御措施来应对伪数据攻击.
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