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张倩颖(1986－),女,博士,讲师,CCF 专业会 赵世军(1985－),男,博士,华为技术有限公
员,主要研究领域为嵌入式操作系统,系统 司技术专家,主要研究领域为信息安全,系
安全,形式化验证. 统安全,可信计算.