Page 361 - 《软件学报》2026年第7期
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3046                                                       软件学报  2026  年第  37  卷第  7  期


                    由图  4  可知, 不同模型所需的迭代步数存在差异. 具体而言, 针对               IV_PLDA  和  XV_PLDA  模型发起攻击的难
                 度相对较低, 其所需的迭代步数较少; 而针对             ResNet 和  ECAPA  模型的攻击难度则相对较高, 需要更多的迭代次
                 数才能达到预期效果. 此外, 不同置信度水平下的攻击效率呈现出明显的差别. 置信度越高, 需要进行的迭代次数
                                                              κ = 3/0.1 的设置情形下, 平均需要     300  次迭代才能够完
                 就越多, 同时生成的对抗音频的攻击成功率也相应越高. 在
                 成攻击. 虽然提高置信度在一定程度上能够提升攻击效果, 但这也会导致所需的迭代次数增多, 进而使得资源消耗
                 大幅增加.

                  5   总 结

                    本文提出了一种基于说话人信息的音频对抗攻击方法——SIAttack. 该方法首先对原始音频进行信息解耦, 随
                 后在解耦得到的说话人信息上通过迭代优化施加合理范围内的对抗扰动, 并重构生成对抗音频, 以有效攻击说话
                 人识别系统. 大量实验结果表明, SIAttack       生成的对抗音频能够成功误导当前主流说话人识别模型. 与现有对抗攻
                 击方法相比, SIAttack  所生成的样本在迁移性、隐蔽性与鲁棒性这                3  个方面均表现出更优的性能. 本研究揭示了
                 在音频深层语义信息层面实施对抗攻击的可行性, 为音频对抗攻击领域的研究提供了新的方向.

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