Page 274 - 《软件学报》2021年第9期

2898 Journal of Software 软件学报 Vol.32, No.9, September 2021

方面的研究较少.因此,抗随机数后门攻击的密钥协商协议、签名算法、签密算法等方向都是未来的研究方向.
最后,现有的抗随机数后门攻击密码算法大多数只能在随机预言模型下得到证明,在标准模型下可证明安全的
抗随机数后门攻击密码算法为数不多.标准模型下,高效的抗随机数后门攻击密码算法还待进一步研究.

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